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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE FARl\f :MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

Case No.

RICHARD KAY and
ThlYRTLE L. KAY,
Defendants and Respondents.

12300

Brief in Support of Rehearing
STATEl\'IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by
the Appellant State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
to avoid coverage under a policy of automobile liability
insurance issued to the Respondent Myrtle L. Kay of
any judgment obtained by the Respondent Richard Kay
against said :Myrtle L. Kay for injuries and damages ineurrcd as a result of a one car rollover on August 4, 1968.
Appellant asserts its so-called "family and household"
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exclusion to liability coverage. Respondent Richard Kay
asserts that Appellant is estopped from asserting said
exclusion to liability coverage, and that said exclusion is
ambiguous and should be construed against the Appellant, and that said exclusion is void as against the public
policy of the State of Utah.

DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT
The trial court granted the Respondent's motions
for summary judgment, holding that Appellant was
estopped from
its so-called "family and house- '
hold" exclusion in that the Respondent lVIyrtle L. Kay
had been prejudiced as a matter of law by Appellant's
unconditional defense of Myrtle Kay in a suit brought
by Richard Kay for his injuries; and denied Appellant's
motions for summary judgment.

DISPOSITION IN THE SUPREl\IE COURT
In its decision filed July 28, 1971, the Court held
that the trial court had improperly found as a matter of
law that the Respondent Myrtle Kay had been prejudiced by the conduct of the Appellant, and the Court
reversed the summary judgment in Respondent's favor
and entered judgment for Appellant. Justices Ellett
and Crockett concurred in the reversal but dissented
to the granting of judgment to the Appellant and the
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refusal to remand the matter for trial on the issue of
prejudice.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Respondents seek to have the issue of prejudice
remanded to the lower court for trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are as stated in Respondents prior briefs
and will not therefore, be restated herein.

ARGUMENT
THE SUPREME COURT BY ITS lVIAJORITY OPINION ERRED IN NOT REMANDING
THIS CASE TO THE TRIAL COURT FOR
TRIAL ON THE ISSUE OF PREJUDICE.
The heart of Respondents position is that Myrtle
Kay was prejudiced by the conduct of the Appellant
State Farm Mutual by unconditionally accepting and
undertaking her defense in the personal injury filed by
the Respondent Richard Kay. This case was first assigned to Judge Maurice Harding, who set the case
down for determination of whether or not the Respondent 1\Iyrtle Kay had been prejudiced. Judge Harding
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disqualified himself and the case was then assigned to
Judge Allen B. Sorenson. At the time of pre-trial, Judge
Sorenson ruled that as a matter of law the Respondent Myrtle Kay had been prejudiced, and there- '
fore, her motion for summary judgment and that of
Richard Kay was granted and Appellant's motion for
summary judgment denied. Respondents in support of
their motions for summary judgment, and on appeal,
cited numerous cases with similar facts wherein the existence of prejudice was held to be presumed, and other
cases which held the issue of prejudice was a jury question. The Respondents should not be penalized by a denial of a trial on that issue merely because the trial court
adopted the proposition most favorable to the Respondent, to wit, presumption of prejudice. By the
Court's rejection of that proposition, there now exists a material issue of fact to be determined, i.e.,
whether the Respondent Myrtle Kay was prejudiced
by the assumption of her defense by the Appellant
and by the method and manner in which the same was
conducted. The situation here is no different than
in the case of Rice vs. Granite School District, 23
U2d 22, 456 P2d 159, (1969), where the issue was
whether or not the Defendant was estopped from relying on its defense of sovereign immunity arising from
Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, which failure allegedly occurred
as a result of conduct by Defend ant's insurance carrier.
The trial court in that case granted summary judgment
in favor of the Defendant. On appeal the Court reversed

6

the summary judgment and remanded to the trial court
for determination of the factual elements of estoppel, the
prime element of course, being prejudice. Respondents
can discern no material difference between the present
case and the Rice case which would explain and justify
the different results in each case on remand. The Respondents are entitled to a trial on the question of prejudice unless they cannot prevail under "any possible state
of the evidence." Dopp vs. Richards, 43 U 332, 135 Pacific 98 ( 1913) . The evidence certainly contains sufcient facts and inferrences of prejudice that a jury could
make such a finding. The Court remanded for retrial the issue of bad faith by an insurance company in
Soliz vs. Ammerman, 22 U2d 190, 450 P2d 460 (1969)
on evidence of conduct less culpable than in the present
case.
Furthermore, as pointed out by the dissenting
opinion, the denial of Appellant's motions for summary
judgment was not a final judgment and not appealable
except by interlocutory appeal, Jensen vs. Nielsen, 22
U2d 23, 447 P2d 906, Daehler vs. U.S., 149 F2d 130?
(C.C.A. 2d, 1945).

CONCLUSION

It is obvious that the Court unanimously concluded
that there was insufficient basis for the trial court to hold
as a matter of law that the Respondent Myrtle Kay was
prejudiced. On the other hand, Respondents respectfully
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submit that to hold as a matter of law that no prejudice
existed improperly deprives Respondents of a trial on
that material issue of fact.
Respectfully submitted:
DELBERT M. DRAPER, JR.,
HEBER GRANT IVINS, and
W. BRENT WILCOX
By W. Brent Wilcox
RAWLINGS, ROBERTS & BLACK
By John L. Black
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